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GALLAGHER REVISITED:




O NE OF THE TRADITIONAL talismans that permeates Ameri-
can Jurisprudence is the elevation of substance over form. Both
the Internal Revenue Service and the federal judiciary have properly
utilized this principle to vitiate taxpayers' attempts to avoid tax liability.
However, unique problems develop when, in certain sections, the federal
tax structure provides rather detailed provisions for discerning tax
consequences. Individuals comply with these provisions, as interpreted,
in their business dealings, but the Internal Revenue Service on occasion
concludes that, nonetheless, there is tax avoidance.
This Article will focus on these problems in the area of corporate
liquidations and reincorporations. Under the current tax laws, markedly
diverse tax consequences can result from characterizing a corporate
transaction as a liquidation-reincorporation or a reorganization. How-
ever, the operative facts that qualify a transaction as within either of
these categories can be created by the taxpayer. Naturally, the Com-
missioner has argued that attempts to qualify under a particular section,
in order to have advantageous tax consequences, should be disregarded
as mere formal compliance, and that, therefore, the transaction should
be treated in a different manner. The reaction of the judiciary to this
approach and the soundness of this reaction will be the primary point
of departure for this Article.
II. THE CONFLICTING APPROACHES
The genesis of the problem is that "dividends" are taxable at
ordinary income rates1 whereas amounts received in exchange for the
t Member of the New Jersey Bar. A.B., Cornell University, 1964; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1967.
1. IN'. Rev. CODE op 1954, § 316 provides that any distribution of property
made by a corporation to its shareholders, out of its earnings and profits, is a dividend.
[Hereinafter references to the 1954 Code will be by section only]. Section 301(c) (1)
then provides that dividends are includable in gross income just as section 61 provides
that wages are includable in gross income.
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stock of a corporation' or in the liquidation3 of a corporation are en-
titled to the favorable capital gains treatment.4 Therefore, shareholders
in closely held corporations with retained earnings have often eschewed
ordinary dividends and sought, through various procedures, to liqui-
date their corporation, and transfer' the operating assets to a new
corporation.
Two significant cases have been decided within recent years in this
liquidation-reincorporation area, each representing an antithetical ap-
proach to the resolution of the issue of what tax consequences shall
result from certain corporate activity. In order to outline the general
type of corporate activity involved, and to highlight the divergent ap-
proaches, these two cases will be discussed initially. A detailed analysis
of the applicable Internal Revenue Code sections and their legislative
histories will then be undertaken.
In Joseph C. Gallagher,6 the Tax Court dealt with the liquidation
and reincorporation of West Coast Terminals, Inc. In 1946, West
Coast had been organized as a Delaware corporation to engage in the
stevedoring business in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas. The
business proved to be successful and by 1955, although dividends had
only been paid twice in the nine year period, the corporation had a
retained earned surplus in excess of $800,000. However, four stock-
holders, owning 38.05% of the stock, were not active in the business,
and a number of managerial personnel held no shares. Therefore, in
order to eliminate the inactive stockholders, permit seven employees
to acquire an equity interest, and withdraw the substantial retained
earned surplus, the shareholders voted to liquidate the corporation on
June 14, 1955.
Pursuant to the plan, West Coast Terminals, Inc., a California
corporation, was formed on June 17, 1955. In exchange for $300,000
in cash, the five active shareholders of the Delaware corporation re-
ceived 72.67% and the seven employees received 27.33% of the com-
mon stock in the new corporation. The California corporation then
purchased Delaware's operating assets for the book value of $100,
264.56. During these transactions, the stevedoring business continued
2. Section 1221 defines "capital asset" so as to include corporate stock. Section
1222(3) defines "capital gain" to be the gain from the "sale or exchange" of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months.
3. Section 331 provides that amounts received by shareholders "in complete
liquidation" of a corporation are to be given capital gains treatment as an amount "in
full payment in exchange for the stock."
4. Sections 1201 and 1202 provide that the maximum tax on capital gains shall
be 25%.
5. Section 351 makes the transfer tax free.
6. 39 T.C. 144 (1962), appeals dismissed, Nos. 18844, 18845 (9th Cir., Sept. 23,
1963), acquiesced in result onlv, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 5.
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without interruption. Delaware proceeded to liquidate and distributed
$1,000,000 in cash in 1955 and $78,521 in cash and property in 1956.
Although all of Delaware's shareholders reported the amounts received
in excess of their adjusted bases as capital gains, the Commissioner
assessed deficiencies against four of the five' continuing shareholders
on the ground that the amounts which they received were fully taxable
as dividends.
The Commissioner advanced two theories. In the first instance
he argued that there was, in substance, no "complete liquidation" and
that the distribution was, therefore, a dividend under section 301,
thereby implying that it was not within section 302(b) (1). In the
alternative, he argued that there was a "reorganization" within section
368 ' and that the distribution constituted "boot" under section 356
in that it constituted property not within sections 354 or 355.l"
A majority of the Tax Court rejected both arguments. In rejecting
the first, the court held that there was full compliance with the liquida-
tion sections and that if there is to be ordinary income treatment in a
liquidation-reincorporation case, it must be within the reorganization
sections. Moving to the Commissioner's second contention, the court
concluded that there could be no (D)" reorganization because of the
absence of "control' '12 immediately after the transfer. The Com-
missioner argued that some steps in the transaction could be disre-
garded as being unessential to the "dominant purpose," which he
characterized as the withdrawal of corporate earnings and a continua-
tion of a substantial equity interest. This argument was dismissed
7. The opinion of the court does not reveal whether a deficiency was also assessed
against the fifth active and continuing shareholder.
8. Section 331 (a) (1) provides: "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation
of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock." Section
331 (b) provides that section 301 shall not apply.
9. The word "reorganization" is defined in section 368(a) (1).
10. Gain on Exchanges.-
(1) Recognition of Gain.-If-
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of property
permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain
but also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in
excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
Section 356(a).
11. [A] transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corpora-
tion if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its share-
holders ... is in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred;
but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under
section 354, 355, or 356;
Section 368(a) (1) (D) [hereinafter referred to as a (D) reorganization].
12. "'[C]ontrol' means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote. ... Section
368(c) [hereinafter referred to as "control"].
SPRING 1968]
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with little consideration. In so doing, the court refused to find either
an (E) 13 or (F) 4 reorganization.
However, if the Commissioner's position were accepted - that
the withdrawal of some shareholders and the sale of stock to new
shareholders could be disregarded - then the remaining transaction
would be merely a shift in the state of incorporation and a distribution
of money, and there would be a 100% continuity of interest of the
shareholders. As such, the control requirement of (D) would be met.
In the alternative, the transaction would be little more than a mere
change in name, form, or state of incorporation, thereby constituting
an (F) reorganization together with a dividend.
The three judge minority believed that the court should block
what it viewed as a transparent device and concluded that since there
was a "continuity of business enterprise," there was no complete liqui-
dation under the rationale of Bazley v. Commissioner.15
Four years later, in Davant v. Commissioner, ' the Commissioner
finally convinced a court that transactions in the liquidation-reincorpora-
tion area could be segmented in order to isolate a reorganization and
tax the distributions as boot. The Commissioner's concern was pre-
cipitated by the fact that the liquidation of the corporation was ac-
companied by a concomitant transfer of its operating assets to a sister
corporation. Four families each owned a 25% interest in both the South
Texas Rice Warehouse Company, a Texas corporation formed in
1936 for the purpose of carrying on the business of drying, cleaning,
and storing rice, and the South Texas Water Company, a Texas cor-
poration formed in 1934 in order to rent land to South Texas Rice
Farms and to hold and operate an irrigation canal system used to
irrigate the ricelands it leased to Farms. Warehouse obtained its rice
mainly from Water. Farms was a partnership of the four families
and re-leased the land to tenant farmers who paid Farms with 50%
of their rice crop. Although the books and records were prepared
separately for the three businesses, they were all kept in one office.
By 1960, Warehouse had accumulated earnings and profits of
$160,132.29 and Water had accumulated earnings and profits of
13. "[A] recapitalization. Section 368(a)(1)(E) [hereinafter referred to
as an (E) reorganization].
14. "[A] mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected." Section 368(a) (1) (F) [hereinafter referred to as an (F) reorganization].
15. 331 U.S. 737 (1947). In Basley, a closely held corporation exchanged its $100
par value stock for no par stock and debentures. The Supreme Court held that the
debentures were to be taxed as an ordinary dividend and that the transaction was not
a tax-free recapitalization. The Court's analysis of the transaction is pregnant with
seeds of confusion. See p. 514 infra.
16. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), rev'g in
part sub noma., South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
[VOL. 13 : p. 487
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$658,884.66. The shareholders wished to transfer Warehouse's operat-
ing assets to Water for $700,000 and then liquidate Warehouse. Their
attorney advised them that the Commissioner would probably deny them
capital gains treatment and treat the distribution as an ordinary divi-
dend. Therefore, following the advice of their attorney, the parties
sold all of their Warehouse stock to the attorney's son who then sold
Warehouse's operating assets to Water and liquidated Warehouse.
Although the son participated in the actual transfers, he never took part
in the formulation of this plan. On August 26, 1960, the son bor-
rowed $914,200 from a bank and bought all of the Warehouse stock
with this sum. Water then bought Warehouse's assets for $700,000
and the son subsequently liquidated Warehouse. The son received
$230,000 from Warehouse's bank account, paid back the loan with
interest of $152.37, and made $15,583.30 for himself. All of this took
one hour and none of the businesses were ever disrupted.
The taxpayers argued that this was a bona fide sale; the Com-
missioner contended that there was a reorganization. The Tax Court
held that there was a (D) reorganization and that the gain was
taxable as a dividend to the extent of Warehouse's earnings and
profits.17 The court of appeals held that there was no complete liquida-
tion within the meaning of section 331, that there was both an (F) and
a (D) reorganization, and that the distribution was a dividend to the
extent of the earnings and profits of Water, as well as of Warehouse."8
In order to reach this result the court of appeals combined all of the
transactions and found that although the stockholders severed them-
selves from the corporate shell, they did not sever themselves from the
business, and, therefore, a complete liquidation did not occur. Then,
separating the steps and disregarding the distributions of cash, the
court found an (F) reorganization in that the transfer of ownership
of the operating assets from Warehouse to Water was a mere change
of form. The use of Water's earnings and profits to determine the
amount of the dividend was justified on three alternative grounds.
The court, citing Bazley, 9 found a section 301 dividend functionally
unrelated to the reorganization. In the alternative, the court held that
the cash was boot under section 356, with two distributing corpora-
tions, or that under section 4822" the earnings and profits of Warehouse
17. South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965). See § 316.
18. 366 F.2d at 884, 887.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether
or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests,
the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades,
or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation
SPRING 1968]
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and Water could be combined and considered as one distributing
corporation.
A. The Theoretical Divergence
The significance of the Gallagher and Davant cases is not in their
results, but in their underlying theories. To combat attempted tax
avoidance by taxpayers who structure transactions as liquidations with
a subsequent transfer of assets to a new corporation, the Commissioner
has used the reorganization sections. 2' Section 368 defines a reorgani-
zation; section 354 is the operative section establishing criteria for
the non-recognition of gain or loss, and section 356 is the operative
section providing for dividend treatment for property, other than stock
or securities, distributed in a reorganization. In general terms, the 1939
Code provided for similar results.22 In addition to possible dividend
treatment, a further incentive for the taxpayer to avoid the reorganiza-
tion path is that assets received by the transferee corporation do not
get a stepped-up basis for depreciation purposes if the reorganization
sections are applied.2"
Under the 1939 Code, the Commissioner treated these liquidation-
reincorporation or sale of assets-liquidation (or preincorporation)
24
transactions as (D) reorganizations.25 The reorganization provisions
were applied when the old corporation transferred assets to the new
is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
Section 482.
21. The best discussion of the reincorporation problems is in Lane, The Reincor-
poration Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARV. L. Rzv. 1218
(1964). See also B. BITTKR & J. EusTicn, FnDORAL INcOMS TAXATION or CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDnRS § 12.22 (2d ed. 1966) ; 3 J. MSRTnNs, Tri LAW or FEDXRAL
INcOMS TAXATION §§ 20.91, 20.92, 20.94, 20.95 (rev. ed. 1965); Grubb, Corporate
Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liquidation, 28 U. CIN. L. Rtv.
304 (1959) ; MacLean, Problems of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the
Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX L. Rev. 407 (1958); Nicholson, Recent
Developments in the Reincorporation Area, 19 TAX L. Rtv. 123 (1964).
22. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g) (1), 53 Stat. 40, as amended, ch. 247,
§ 213(b), 53 Stat. 870 (1939) [hereinafter referred to as Int. Rev. Code of 1939]
defined a reorganization. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (3), provided for tax-
free treatment to the exchange of stocks and securities, and Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 112(c) (2), provided for dividend treatment for the boot.
23. See generally Levin, The Case for a Stepped-Up Basis to the Transferee in
Certain Reorganizations, 17 TAX L. Rev. 511 (1962).
24. A "preincorporation" is a transaction where the shareholders of a corpora-
tion create a new corporation, cause the old corporation to transfer or sell its operat-
ing assets to the new corporation, and then cause the old corporation to be liquidated.
Just as with a liquidation-reincorporation where the old corporation is liquidated and
the shareholders transfer the operating assets to a new corporation, the shareholders
have a going business and cash in their pockets.
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g) (1), defined a reorganization as:
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation, or . . . (C) a transfer by a corporation
of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the
transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred, or (D) a recapitalization, or (E) a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
[VOL.13: p. 487
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for stock and then liquidated,26 when the old corporation transferred
assets to the new for cash and then liquidated,27 and when the old
corporation liquidated and the stockholders reincorporated with the
new assets. ' The courts analyzed the transactions in the spirit of
Gregory v. Helvering,s0 and by the use of the "step-transaction" doc-
trine3" looked solely to the net effect in order to determine the tax
consequences. Under this approach deviations from the precise statu-
tory language were not controlling on the Commissioner.
Section 112(b) (3) of the 1939 Code "' required an exchange of
stock, but the courts found that this, in substance, had been ac-
complished when the old stock was surrendered to the old corporation
and the new stock was issued directly by the new corporation to the
stockholders.12 Although the Code also required a transfer of assets
from the old corporation to the new, 3 the fact that the assets went
from the old corporation to the stockholders to the new corporation did
not affect the result.
3 4
This is not to say that the Commissioner was without difficulties.
He was never able to persuade the courts to waive the control require-
ments of section ll 2 (g) (1) (D).' 5 Moreover, notwithstanding the
26. E.g., Becher v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'g 22 T.C. 932
(1954) ; Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C. 1080
(1948).
27. E.g., Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956), aff'g 23 T.C. 196 (1954) ; Liddon v. Commissioner,
230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956), rev'g on other grounds,
22 T.C. 1220 (1954).
28. E.g., Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) ; Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947),
aff'g 5 T.C. 665 (1945).
29. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The taxpayer owned all of the shares of corporation A,
which owned 1000 shares of corporation B. If A had distributed the shares of B to
taxpayer, the taxpayer would have received an ordinary dividend. Instead, taxpayer
created corporation C, A transferred its B corporation shares to C, the shares of C
were issued to taxpayer, and then taxpayer liquidated C, receiving the B corporation
shares. Although each step fit within the non-recognition provisions, dividend treat-
ment was imposed on the theory that the transfers lacked a business purpose, and
that there was one complete plan - A's distribution of B corporation's shares to
the taxpayer. The spirit of this case is that "substance" will prevail over "form."
However, given formal compliance with the reorganization provisions, the absence of
a corporate business purpose will not prevent the Commissioner from imposing these
provisions on a series of transactions in order to tax the boot as a dividend. Lewis v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C. 1080 (1948).
30. See pp. 523-25 infra.
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(b) (3) (now INT. Riv. CoDt ol 1954,
§ 354).
32. E.g., Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940), aff'g 39 B.T.A. 172
(1939) ; Morley Cypress Trust, Schedule "B," 3 T.C. 84 (1944).
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g) (1) (D). This section should be com-
pared with section 368(a) (1) (D) of the current Code.
34. E.g., Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), aff'g 5 T.C.
665 (1945). See also Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) (from old corporation to directors to new
corporation).
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g) (1) (D). Control was defined in Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch, 1, § 112(h) (now INT. RiV. CoDX oF 1954, § 368(c)) to be
"the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 per centum of the total combined voting
SPRING 1968] 493
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fact that the courts had concluded that a liquidation could be part of a
reorganization,3 6 they did not always reach this result. For example,
in United States v. Arcade Co.,3 7 the old corporation was completely
liquidated and the assets were transferred to a trustee for the benefit
of the shareholders. Shortly thereafter, the trustee transferred the
assets to a new corporation in which the shareholders had proportional
interests similar to the old. The court held that there was no reorgani-
zation because the formation of the new corporation was not part of
the plan of liquidation of the old. The court appeared to be impressed
by the fact that the old corporation could not transfer assets to the
new since it was liquidated before the new corporation was formed,
that there was no agreement between the old and new corporations,
and that the shareholders had no contractual obligation to form a new
corporation or to transfer the assets from the old to the new. Although
there are some cases88 consistent with Arcade, such a segmentation no
longer appears to be of any significance. 9 Nonetheless, it is this prob-
lem of determining which parts of a series of transactions to group
together that is the core of the difference between the Gallagher and
Davant approaches.
The 1954 Code did not change the definitions of (E) and (F)
reorganizations, but by restricting the definition of the (D) reorganiza-
tion through the addition of the requirement that securities be dis-
tributed pursuant to a section 354, 355, or 356 transaction as part
of the plan of reorganization, it did create new problems. Section 356
is the boot provision and section 355 covers spin-offs and related
transactions. Section 354(a) (1) provides for non-recognition of gain
when stocks or securities are exchanged, but section 354(b) requires
that the transferee receive "substantially all" of the "assets" of the
transferor and that the stock, securities, and other properties received
by the transferor be distributed to its shareholders.
The Commissioner has had excellent success in coping with the
new problems. He has successfully argued that the phrase "substan-
tially all of the assets" in section 354(b) (1) (A) is similar to "sub-
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per centum of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation." The Commissioner
tried to avoid the 80% "control" test in only one case, and he lost. Austin Transit,
Inc., 20 T.C. 849 (1953), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
36. E.g., Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 824 (1956) ; Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'g 10 T.C.
1080 (1948) ; Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), aff'g 5 T.C.
665 (1945).
37. 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953).
38. E.g., Hendricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Charles R.
Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953) (where the liquidation successfully broke the series
of steps on the ground that the reincorporation was not part of the plan to liquidate
the old corporation).
39. See cases cited note 36 supra.
[VOL. 13 : p. 487
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stantially all of the properties" in section 368(a) (1) (C), and, there-
fore, it means substantially all of the operating assets.4" Although a
(D) reorganization requires stock of the transferee to be distributed,
and section 354(a) (1) requires an "exchange" of stock or securities,
the courts recently have held that there need be no distribution, ex-
change, or issuance of stock from the new corporation where it would
be a meaningless gesture.4'
Although there has been little hesitation to interpret the Code
liberally in order to find "substantially all" and "exchanges" and "dis-
tributions," there has been great reluctance to look through transac-
tions to find reorganizations in the Gallagher type of situation. Where
a group of shareholders is in actual control of a corporation, they can
use this control to avoid taxes just as easily with 79% control as with
81%. In such a situation the 80% control test seems as meaningless
as does the requirement of an "exchange." One explanation for the
difference is that the result when there is, for example, no distribution
of stock is, in effect, identical with the result which would be obtained
if there had been a distribution, but in the Gallagher case, the result
still left the continuing shareholders with less than 80% control. A
system of taxation which requires identical tax treatment for a given
result, regardless of how it is achieved, is not an irrational system.
However, once that system establishes the statutory criteria for that
result, it would appear that these criteria must be met unless the failure
to do so does not result in undermining the criteria. Otherwise, the
criteria become meaningless.
David T. Grubbs42 illustrates this liberal interpretation when the
result is within the intended scope of the Code. As in Gallagher,
shareholders of an existing corporation formed a new one to carry on
the business of the old. The old corporation sold its assets to the new
40. Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1018 (1967), rev'g in part, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965); Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967);
Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967), affg 42 T.C. 558 (1964) ; Ralph C. Wilson, Sr., 46 T.C. 334 (1966) ; James
Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964). The recent cases considering the "substantially
all of the properties" requirement of section 368(a) (1) (C) are, for the most part,
consistent with the "operating asset" concept for (D). See Lane, The Reincorporation
Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed?, 77 HARV. L. Rtv. 1218, 1249-53
(1964) and the cases cited therein.
The theory behind the "operating asset" concept is that: since a corporation
can declare a cash dividend whenever it wishes, doing so in conjunction with a
reorganization should not prevent the application of the reorganization provisions of
the Code. The cases, however, reveal confusion as to the meaning of "operating asset."
41. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967); Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1016 (1967) ; Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1962). The premise here is that if the same shareholders own
shares in corporations A and B, in identical proportions, and A transfers its assets
to B, it is a meaningless gesture, in this context, for B to issue more shares.
42. 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
SPRING 1968]
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corporation at book value, and the old corporation then made distribu-
tions which its shareholders claimed were entitled to capital gains
treatment, but which the Commissioner treated as dividends. Unlike
Gallagher, however, the control requirements were satisfied and the
old corporation was not liquidated. Rather, it redeemed the shares
of all but one of its shareholders, including those of Grubbs. The
remaining shareholder then used the old corporation for a new line
of business activity. The court, not unsurprisingly, found a (D)
reorganization. However, in order to satisfy section 354(b) (1) (B),
which is required for a (D) reorganization under section 368(a) (1)-
(D), it must be found that "the stock, securities, and other properties
received by such transferor, as well as the other properties of such
transferor, are distributed in pursuance of the plan of reorganization."
Not only did the old corporation not receive any stocks or securities,
it did not distribute all of its other property. Nonetheless, the court
held that this provision of the Code was complied with because the
remaining shareholder, in effect, received his share but chose to leave
it in the corporate shell. Hence, one can expect the courts in the
future to utilize a similarly liberal construction of the Code where the
net effect is the same and where requiring literal compliance would be
a meaningless gesture. It should be noted, however, that such courts
neither recast the transaction into another mold nor waive the effect
of any requirement. Rather, they judicially supply steps in the trans-
action created by the parties, the omission of which are too insubstan-
tial to warrant a different tax treatment.
B. Analytical Problems
Although Davant posed problems different from Gallagher, its
rationale in finding an (F) reorganization merits close scrutiny. The
court found that "[t]hree distinct and separate things occurred":'3
$700,000 in Water's earnings and profits went to the shareholders by
way of Warehouse; $200,000 in Warehouse's earnings and profits
were distributed to the shareholders; and then Warehouse's operating
assets were combined with Water's. The court found that the only
legitimate business purpose in the whole transaction was the elimination
of Warehouse's corporate shell. The other two transactions were not
necessary to accomplish this, and it "is apparent that no functional
relationship exists between either the $200,000 coming to petitioners
from Warehouse or the $700,000 coming to petitioners from Water
and the transfer of Warehouse's assets to Water."44
43. 366 F.2d at 882.
44. Id.
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The taxpayers contended that since the reorganization sections
were not literally satisfied there was a complete liquidation. The court
correctly pointed out that the capital gains provisions of the liquidation
sections were not intended by Congress to be a vehicle for distributing
earnings when followed immediately by a reincorporation of the operat-
ing assets. The court then reasoned that since it cannot be a liqui-
dation, it must be a reorganization, this being the converse of the
taxpayers' argument. In finding that there was no liquidation, the
court said that, for the purpose of determining whether section 331
was applicable, it viewed the plan as a whole to the extent that the
parts were functionally related. The substance of the court's reasoning
seems to be that since there was a continuity of the business activities
and since the distribution can be ignored, there was, in substance, no
liquidation. The court held that there was an (F) reorganization.
After deferential reference to Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp.,4"
the court concluded that the merger of the assets was a mere change
in form because it was immaterial which corporation held the assets.
The court departed from precedent not only in using an (F)
theory where the liquid assets were distributed, but also in using it
where the second corporation had a separate existence with its own
assets and business. In other words, by treating the transfer of
assets to Water as a separate transaction, the court found that there
was "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, how-
ever effected."' 46  The court construed the (F) definition in the dis-
junctive, and interpreted the word "form" to mean a change in form as
opposed to a change in substance.47
What constitutes a change in substance? Was the court there
referring to Southwest? Would a shift in the proportionate interests
of the shareholders be a change in substance? This question was subse-
quently answered in the negative by the same three judge court, with
one judge dissenting this time, in Reef Corp. v. Commissioner.4  In
short, the old corporation transferred its assets to a new corporation
and then liquidated, leaving 52% of the old shareholders owning 100%
of the stock in the new corporation. The questions litigated included
whether the new corporation, Reef Corporation, was entitled to a
45. 315 U.S. 194 (1942). Southwest involved a corporation which defaulted on
its debts and was forced into a state receivership proceeding. The corporation was
reorganized so that the creditors received most of the stock. The Court held that
because of the shift in proprietary interest, there was no (F) reorganization. Id. at
202-03. The ramifications of this decision are explored at pp. 502-04 infra.
46. Section 368 (a) (1) (F).
47. 366 F.2d at 884.
48. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967), rev'g in
part, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1965). Both Reef and Davant were argued on the
same day by the same counsel before Judges Rives, Bell and Fulton. In fact, the briefs
in each case referred to the other case.
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stepped-up basis for depreciation purposes49 and whether, under section
381, one or two tax returns were due. The transactions involved a
strawman, as did Davant, and as in Davant, the court ignored the
strawman and found a (D) reorganization.
Though this resolved the basis question, it did not answer the
section 381 question involving the tax return issue. The Government's
argument on section 381 necessarily rested on classifying the transaction
as an (F) reorganization,5" and the Government suggested that the
transaction be viewed as an unrelated redemption followed by an (F)
reorganization. The Tax Court refused to separate the transaction
and then refused to apply (F) because of the shift in proprietary
interests, citing Southwest, Gallagher and Estate of James F. Suter.5'
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on this issue, with
Judge Bell dissenting. The court said that Southwest 52 no longer
applies because the 1954 Code completely reversed the 1939 Code.5"
The court held that, in substance, there were two "functionally unre-
lated" events: 48% of the stock was redeemed, and Old Reef became
New Reef. Either step could have been taken without the other, and
complete redemptions, the court said, have nothing to do with a
reorganization.54 In the name of congressional intent, the court re-
vealed its test: "The test of whether events should be viewed separately
or together as part of a single plan is not temporal but is functional.""5
Hence, the court concluded, the redemption is to be treated under
section 302 and the rest of the transaction is clearly an (F) reorgani-
zation although it is also a (D) reorganization. Referring to section
381, the court said:
If a corporation did no more than completely redeem the
stock interest belonging to 48% of its shareholders, it could not
under the Code make wholesale accounting method changes. Like-
49. Section 362(b) caused the issue to center on whether there was a reorgani-
zation.
50. The effect of section 381 (b) (1) is that only in an (F) reorganization is one
tax return to be filed by the two corporate entities.
51. 29 T.C. 244 (1957) (finding no (F) reorganization on the ground that the
steps could not be artificially segmented but must be viewed as one transaction).
52. See pp. 502-04 infra.
53. 368 F.2d at 134. The court ignored the fact that the wording of (F) has
been in the tax laws since 1921. In 1954, the House version of the Code, H.R. 8300,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), omitted (F), perhaps because the draftsmen believed
it was meaningless. Cf. R. PAUL, Reorganizations, in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION
3, 82 (3d Series 1940). In conference, however, (F) was put back in, without ex-
planation. This hardly indicates that Congress intended to change the meaning of (F).
54. The court begs the question. In fact, there was no redemption. Rather, the
transaction fell within the liquidation-reincorporation pattern and the real question
was whether, under the facts, the transaction fit within the reorganization provisions.
It would seem unsound to ground a decision on a distinction wrought by recasting
and labelling a transaction so as to create the very distinction the court purports
to find.
55. 368 F.2d at 134. The court cited Davant and Bazley v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 737 (1947), for support.
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wise, if a corporation did no more than change its name and
state of incorporation, it could not under the Code make wholesale
accounting method changes. Combining these two events, neither
of which would be sufficient alone, will not permit a corporation
to make wholesale accounting method changes.56
Granted that one's sense of fairness is not offended by the court's
result, the method used to reach the result is untenable. The only
limit suggested by the Reef court on its doctrines would be "if the
change in proprietary interests were to new persons and less than
50% of the former stockholders' interest in the old corporation re-
mained in the new corporation."57 This, the court said, would more
closely resemble a sale of assets to a new corporation.
Judge Bell in his dissent argued that (F) was properly applied
in Davant where assets were shifted between corporations with identical
shareholders, but cannot be applied where there is a shift of proprietary
interests. Judge Bell also felt that Southwest had not been drained of
its vitality by the passage of the 1954 Code.
Gallagher, then, under the rationale of the Fifth Circuit, comes
within the (F) reorganization provision. The transaction, the court
might argue, can be viewed as three functionally unrelated events: a
redemption of 38.05% of the stock; a switch from a Deleware corpo-
ration to a California corporation; and a sale of 27.33% of the new
corporation's stock to outsiders. Since any one of the three could
have been done without the other two, the Fifth Circuit would treat
this as three taxable events. Hence, the middle transaction would be
an (F) reorganization and money received by the active shareholders
would be taxable as a dividend under section 301 since there was no
actual redemption of active shareholders which could qualify under
section 302.
It is clear that the Commissioner is seeking to avoid the 80%
control test of (D) by segmenting transactions and fitting them into
the ambit of (F). Can transactions be segmented and recast? Is it
proper, or at least meaningful, to use (F) reorganizations where the
net result is a shift in proprietary interests or the merger of one active
corporation into another? It is submitted that the use of the (F)
reorganization in Gallagher would be improper and that the "func-
tionally unrelated" mechanism of segmenting transactions is unfounded.
It will be necessary to analyze the history of the (F) reorganization
provision and its relation to other Code sections in order to determine
whether this conclusion is proper.
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III. THE (F) REORGANIZATION IN USE
A. Before Gallagher
The history of section 368(a) (1) (F) may be said to begin with
the Revenue Act of 1918 which merely provided for non-recognition
of gain on exchanges of stock or securities "in connection with the
reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation.""8  The
terms "reorganization, merger, or consolidation" were not defined until
1921, when it was provided that:
The word "reorganization," as used in this paragraph, includes
a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one cor-
poration of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least
a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties
of another corporation), recapitalization, or mere change in iden-
tity, form, or place of organization of a corporation, (however
effected) ...
This provision not only gave some substance to "merger or con-
solidation" but also added the language presently found in section
368 (a) (1) (F).
Most probably, the statute was intended to be read and inter-
preted literally. The original House version of the 1921 Act had
merely amplified the 1918 Act slightly and provided that the term
"reorganization :" "includes a merger, consolidation (however effected),
recapitalization, or a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization of a corporation. . ... 60 Thus, the only element of the
Act which apparently was not clear and required some clarification was
the use of the terms "merger or consolidation" and this was remedied
by inserting the lengthy parenthetical definition for the phrase "how-
ever effected." This intendment of literal construction was reflected in
the judicial hostility to any broadening of the concept of "reorgani-
zation."'"
In light of this context, it is suggested that the fairest interpreta-
tion to be given to the language which was to become section
368(a) (1) (F) is a literal one. In other words, the 1921 Act en-
visioned three types of transactions. The Act provided for a reshuffling
58. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
59. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230.
60. H.R. 8245, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(d) (2) (1921).
61. Compare Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933), with Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 57 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
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of interests involving more than one corporation," rearrangements
within one corporation,"8 and rearrangements within one corporation
which may, as a procedural matter, involve another corporate entity,
but which, in substance, involve no changes in the corporation's business
or stockholders.
64
The pre-1954 cases involving (F) reorganizations certainly ap-
pear to bear this out. In Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,5 the
old corporation exchanged all of its capital stock for all of the stock
and debenture bonds of a new corporation. On the same day, the new
corporation dissolved the old, thereby acquiring the assets and lia-
bilities of the old corporation. The court held, without discussing
the meaning of the (F) provision, that although this was not a common
law merger, it did comply with the (F) definition. 6 Similarly, in
George Whittel & Co.,67 new corporation A, a Nevada corporation,
in 1929, exchanged all of its stock with the sole stockholder of old
corporation B for all of the stock of corporation B, a California cor-
poration. Corporation A then acquired all of corporation B's assets and
liabilities and B was dissolved. The Board held that the plan was
designed to change the state of incorporation and was precisely within
the (F) language. Many of the early cases were not models of clarity.
In some, the facts and the language of the courts suggest an (F)
reorganization, but the courts, although finding a reorganization, fail
to cite a particular part of the reorganization section.6" In other cases,
confused judges apparently failed to read carefully.69
Just as the early cases did not suggest a broad scope for (F),
the early rulings revealed the same tendency. Hence, (F) reorganiza-
tions were found only in the rather clear situations where a corporate
charter with a limited life was renewed,70 where a corporation trans-
62. This is provided for in the language prior to the close of the parenthesis in
the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230, quoted at note 59 .upra.
63. This is a recapitalization, now section 368(a) (1) (E).
64. This is the "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization (however
effected)," now section 368(a) (1) (F).
65. 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 611 (1934).
66. Id. at 151.
67. 34 B.T.A. 1070 (1936).
68. E.g., Union Bleachery v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 496, 501 (W.D.S.C.
1947), aff'd, 176 F.2d 517, 518 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964 (1950)
Mente & Co., 24 B.T.A. 401, 404-05 (1931).
69. In San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.
1935), rev'd on other grounds, 297 U.S. 496 (1936), Judge Wilbur said that in the
case below, 28 B.T.A. 395 (1933), the Board had held that when a new corporation
acquires all of the assets of its predecessor for stock and the shareholders of the
predecessor own only 83% of the new stock, there is an (F) reorganization. The
Board said quite clearly, however, only that the transaction was a reorganization, and
fit within the definition section of the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(h)(1), 43
Stat. 257 (now INT. RYv. CODE o1 1954, § 368(a) (1)). The Board did not say that
there was an (F) reorganization.
70. Rev. Rul. 54-269, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 114; O.D. 930, 4 Cum. BULL. 404 (1921).
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ferred its principal office from one county to another and in so doing
surrendered its old charter for a new one,7 where a federal savings
and loan association converted itself into a state building and loan
association,72 and where a joint stock company was converted into
a corporation with the par values of the stock being no greater in
the new corporation than in the old company.78 One commentator,
in discussing the early use of (F), believed that the section was so
little relied upon by taxpayers that "this part of the statute has indeed
perished through lack of use."7
If the (F) language was designed to accomplish considerably
more than the result reached in cases like Ahies and Whittel, it is
certainly strange that the definitional sections of the revenue acts of
those years also included mergers, recapitalizations, consolidations,
stock for stock exchanges, and stock for asset exchanges. This is not
to say that no overlap was intended. Certainly, a "mere change"
transaction can be accomplished within any part of the Revenue Act of
1921.75 On the other hand, to prevent the (F) language from being
nugatory, a construction should be followed under which the language
will mean that there must be a mere change, but given such change,
the manner by which it is consummated is irrelevant. Hence, no par-
ticular procedure is prescribed for the (F) "changes" because despite
such "changes" there is still complete continuity of the business, its
activities, and its stockholders. Such a construction would be consistent
with the early cases and rulings.
This analysis finds considerable support in the landmark case of
Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp.70 In that case, the old corpora-
tion was in default on its debts and, by 1932, was under the control
of a creditors' committee. Pursuant to state receivership proceedings,
a new corporation was formed, and the assets were transferred to the
committee by purchase at the foreclosure sale. Almost all of the new
common stock went to the old bondholders, the rest of the common
and all of the Class A stock purchase warrants went to the unsecured
creditors, and all of the Class B stock purchase warrants went to the
old preferred and common shareholders. Fifteen per cent of the bond-
holders were paid off in cash.
71. I.T. 1152, I- CuM. BULL. 32 (1922). See also Rev. Rul. 66-171, 1966-1 CuM.
BULL. 181.
72. Rev. Rut. 54-193, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 106.
73. O.D. 1051, 5 CuM. BULL. 58 (1921).
74. R. PAUL, Reorganizations, in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 3, 82 (3d Series
1940). Cf. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTIcE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 12.17, at 548 (2d ed. 1966).
75. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230. See text of statute
note 59 supra.
76. 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
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Among many other things, Justice Douglas held, referring to the
(F) language, 77 that "a transaction which shifts the ownership of the
proprietary interest in a corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity,
form, or place of organization' within the meaning of clause E [now
(F)]."'7 s This sentence appears at first to have little meaning. On its
face it means that any shift in proprietary interest precludes an (F)
reorganization, and it has been so interpreted. 79  Does it mean less?
In a companion case, Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., °
Justice Douglas, again writing for the Court, held that where, pursuant
to a bankruptcy reorganization, all the stock of the new corporation
went solely to the creditors of the old, the continuity of interest test s '
was satisfied and there was a reorganization within section 112(i) (1)
of the Revenue Act of 1928." He said that the reorganization did not
shift the equity in the corporation from shareholders to creditors, but
that once the creditors had enforced their claims, they were the equity
owners.8  Hence, there was complete continuity of interest. Non-
assenting creditors were paid off in cash.
In Southwest, Justice Douglas had specifically indicated that
but for the changes between the 1928 and 1934 Revenue Acts,"'
Alabama Asphaltic would control.8 5 If so, then the only shift of
proprietary interests in Southwest was either that the common and pre-
ferred stockholders of the old corporation were given stock warrants
in the new corporation or that 15% of the bondholders were redeemed.
If the old stockholders' receipt of warrants in the new corporation
constituted the shift in proprietary interests, then Southwest would ap-
pear to have been wrongly decided. It is difficult to see how the right
77. The specific statute involved was the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §
112(g) (1) (E), 48 Stat. 705 (now INT. RZv. COD 01? 1954, § 368(a) (1) (F)).
78. 315 U.S. at 202-03.
79. See Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 977, 981-82 (8th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 756 (1943) ; Estate of James F. Suter, 29 T.C. 244, 258
(1957); Stollberg Hardware Co., 46 B.T.A. 788 (1942).
80. 315 U.S. 179 (1942).
81. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940), aff'g 103 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1939) ; Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), aff'g
57 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1932). The test is a judicial requisite for any reorganization
and it requires that the equitable owners of the old business continue to have a
substantial equitable interest in the business of the new corporation. The test would
be met by the old shareholders receiving all of the shares of the new corporation, but
would not be met if all of the old shareholders received only cash.
82. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i) (1), 45 Stat. 818 (now INrT. RZv.
CoDg or 1954, § 368(a) (1)).
83. 315 U.S. at 183.
84. The Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g) (1), 48 Stat. 705, added the
requirement that the new corporation acquire the stock of the old "solely for all or
a part of its [that is, the new corporation's] voting stock." The Supreme Court read
this requirement of "solely" literally and held that since the new corporation paid
some debts of the old in cash and also issued warrants, the "solely" test was not met.
315 U.S. at 199-200.
85. 315 U.S. 194, 198, 202 (1942).
SPRING 1968]
17
Lipkind: Gallagher Revisited: The Functionally Unrelated Corporate Reorgan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
to buy an equity interest is either the same as having one or is, in
itself, any sort of equity interest.8 6 The warrant holder does not vote
nor does he get dividends. Thus, the old stockholders did not have a
proprietary interest in the new corporation, nor, under the doctrine of
Alabama Asphaltic, did they have a proprietary interest in the old
corporation. However, if the shift in proprietary interests in South-
west was that 15% of the bondholders were redeemed, the Supreme
Court must have construed (F) to require virtually a 100% continuity
in proprietary interests. At a minimum, the Court held that an 85%
continuity of stockholder interest is insufficient to qualify as an (F)
reorganization.
It would seem fair to conclude that any construction of section
368(a) (1) (F) which allows for its application in situations where
there is any change in proprietary interests or any change in the total
assets and operations of a corporation finds no support in the language,
holdings, or theories underlying the early cases and rulings.s
7
B. (F) In Other Parts of the Code
1. Section 381. - Section 381 provides for the carryover of earn-
ings and losses in certain transactions. Section 381 (b) (1) provides that
in (F) reorganizations there shall be only one taxable year for both
corporations, not a partial year for before and a partial year for after
the reorganization. The Reef court was influenced by this restriction
and therefore strained to find an (F) reorganization. Classifying a reor-
ganization as (F) will, under section 381 (b) (1), prevent the corpora-
tion from claiming two surtax exemptions under section 11 (d). The
Reef court evidenced a belief that section 381 (b) treated (D) reorgani-
zations more liberally than (F) reorganizations. However, the court
apparently overlooked section 381 (b) (3) which allows losses to be
carried back to pre-reorganization years only in the case of an (F)
reorganization.
The limits on loss carryovers and carrybacks 8 have had a tortured
judicial career and did not emerge into statutory form until the 1954
Code. The Revenue Act of 1921 provided, in section 204(b), that
if any taxpayer sustains a loss for the year, the taxpayer may carry it
86. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1942).
87. "The provision rendering a change in identity, form, or place of organization
a 'reorganization' remains unchanged [in the 1954 Code]. This provision has always
been rather obscure, and its re-enactment [in the 1954 Code] furnishes no clarifica-
tion as to its content." Cohen, Silverman, Surrey, Tarleau, & Warren, The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: Corporate Distributions, Organizations, and Reorganizations,
68 HARV. L. Rnv. 393, 420 (1955).
88. For a brief survey or carryovers and carrybacks see Pennell, Does the Libson
Shops Doctrine Still Apply?, 25 J. TAXATION 336 (1966).
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forward to the next year. 9 In New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,90
the Supreme Court held that where in order to overcome financial diffi-
culties a new corporation took over all of the assets, liabilities, and
business activities of another corporation, had substantially the same
capital structure, had the same shareholders in the same proportions,
and had a continuity of business, there would nonetheless be no carry-
over because two entities were involved and therefore the taxpayer
claiming the deduction was not the same taxpayer as the one who
incurred it. Although subsequent cases alleviated this burden some-
what in the case of mergers, the approaches were nonetheless very
restrictive and the rationales very unclear."
In Newmnarket Mfg. Co. v. United States,92 however, a mean-
ingful result was forthcoming. A Massachusetts corporation created a
Delaware subsidiary and merged into it for the sole purpose of changing
the state of incorporation. There were no changes in the corporation or
shareholdings other than this change in the place of incorporation.
The Commissioner denied a carryback on the theory that the two
corporations were not the same "taxpayer. ' '93 The court said:
When, as here, everything in the business remains the same,
except for the change of corporate domicile from Massachusetts
to Delaware, . . . there is no more reason why the Congress should
choose to attach crucial significance to a mere change of corporate
domicile than it would to a change of an individual taxpayer's
domicile from Massachusetts to Delaware.94
The court went on to state that the 1954 Code now explicitly provides
for this result. Nevertheless, no case granting the carryback privilege
has been found where the corporate reorganization could not be labelled
as a mere change within the Southwest doctrine.
Although the regulations under section 381 shed no light on
the meaning of 368(a)(1)(F), the Revenue Rulings do. Revenue
Ruling 57-276'5 holds that where a corporation changes its place of
incorporation by creating a subsidiary in another state and merging
into it under state law, the reorganization is both an (A) and an (F)
reorganization and, for purposes of section 381, will be deemed an (F).
Revenue Ruling 58-422"6 expands this and holds that where a corpora-
89. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 231.
90. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
91. Compare Stanton Brewery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1949), with E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Commissioner 227 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1955).
92. 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 33 U.S. 983 (1957).
93. Section 122(b) (1) (B) of the 1939 Code is the section construed by the court.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 122(b) (1) (B).
94. 233 F.2d at 497.
95. 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 126.
96. 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 145.
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tion with two subsidiaries creates a new subsidiary in another state
and merges all of its assets into the new subsidiary, thereby resulting
in only one corporation, there is also an (F) reorganization for pur-
poses of section 381. The ruling points out that the old parent could
have liquidated the subsidiaries under section 332 and then changed
its place of incorporation and concludes that the tax results will not
depend on whether the liquidation of the subsidiaries is done simul-
taneously with the reincorporation. The important reason for the
result is that the "stockholders of the former parent had the same equity
in the surviving corporation that they had in the three old corporations,
inasmuch as all of the assets of the three transferor corporations were
held by the surviving corporation."
97
Revenue Ruling 66-284,"s the most recent ruling, is particularly
illuminating. This ruling also involved a statutory merger into a new
subsidiary to effect a change in the place of incorporation. In this
situation, however, less than one per cent of the shareholders dissented
and exercised their appraisal rights. Citing no authority save Revenue
Ruling 58-422, the ruling states that:
The failure of dissenting shareholders owning a total of 1 per cent
of the outstanding shares to participate in the plan of merger
[is] . . . such a de minimis change in the corporation's share-
holders and its assets as not to disqualify the merger as a reorgani-
zation under section 368(a) (1) (F) of the Code.9
The manner in which (F) has been applied to carrybacks is incon-
sistent with the Davant-Reef doctrine, and, in fact, the recent cases
have rejected such an approach." ° The entire history of the carryback
provision reflects a very restrictive approach, especially on the part of
the Government, and the legislative history is entirely consistent with
this.10 1 A broad conception of (F), as in Davant-Reef, would make
the exception in section 381 (b) (3) meaningless. Furthermore, there
is no authority to suggest this result. Rather, the de minimis test
of Revenue Ruling 66-284 is consistent with an interpretation of (F)
which would require virtually a 100% continuity of the business, its
total assets, and its shareholders. The ruling does not contemplate a
97. Id. at 146.
98. 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
99. 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 145.
100. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 115, 116. See Associated Mach. Shop, 48 T.C. 318 (1967);
Estate of Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967).
101. The original House version of the 1954 Code simply provided that there
would be no loss carrybacks after corporate reorganizations. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 381(b) (3) (1954). The Senate added the present exemption for (F)
reorganizations. The report of the Committee on Finance to the Senate reveals no
explanation for the addition. S. Ri. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 276 (1954). The
Conference report is silent also. One suspects that Congress had no intention of
providing an exemption any broader than the narrow Southwest interpretation of (F).
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consolidation of two functioning corporations, regardless of the identity
of the shareholders, nor a shift in the proprietary holdings, and it is
totally inconsistent with Revenue Ruling 61-156, which found an (F)
reorganization even though the owners of the stock of the old corpora-
tion owned only 45% of the stock of the new corporation.'0 2 Finally,
considering the restrictive use of carrybacks which the Commissioner
has long urged, one suspects that he would oppose an application of
section 381 (b) (3) to a Gallagher type of situation. Yet Reef, Davant,
and Revenue Ruling 61-156 would seem to leave him little room for
argument. As Judge Magruder said, "interpretative chickens may come
home to roost at a time when the barnyard wears quite a different
aspect. "103
2. Section 1244. - Ordinary, as opposed to capital, loss treat-
ment for certain stock issued by small corporations is provided for in
section 1244.104 It was designed to encourage capital investment in
small businesses by providing a favorable loss treatment for these risky
investments.' 0 5 In general, stock substituted for section 1244 stock
is not entitled to similar benefits. However, section 1244(d) (2) and
the regulations thereunder'0 ° provide for three exceptions: (1) stock
dividends, (2) stock acquired in (E) reorganizations, and (3) stock
acquired in (F) reorganizations. The legislative history does not ex-
plain these exceptions. The only rational interpretation is that the
benefits of the section are to be restricted to the individual who makes
the investment and to the very corporation in which he invests.'
There have as yet been no cases or rulings on the use of (F) in section
1244.
The use of (F) in section 1244 is consistent with its use in section
381 (b) (3), but, as in its use in section 381 (b) (3), inconsistent with
Davant-Reef.
3. Section 4382. - Section 4382 provides for exemptions from
certain excise taxes, and section 4382(b) (1) provides that the taxes
imposed by sections 4311, 4331, and 436108 shall not apply to
102. 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62. See pp. 519-20 infra. It is amazing that the Internal
Revenue Service was litigating Reef and Davant at the same time it was drafting
Revenue Ruling 66-284. The only rational explanation is that the litigation and ruling
departments are not functionally related.
103. Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650 (1940).
104. See generally Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244,
14 TAX L. Rrv. 453 (1959) ; Rubin, Section 1244 and the Stylish Stout, 12 TUL. TAX
INST. 559 (1963).
105. H.R. Rep. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958).
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.244(d)-3(a) (1960).
107. Rubin, supra note 104, at 567.
108. Sections 4311, 4321, and 4331 have been repealed as of January 1, 1966, and
section 4361 has been repealed as of January 1, 1968. Excise Tax Reduction Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 401 (1965).
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transactions which effectuate any plan of corporate reorganization or
adjustment "whereby a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization is effected." This is the same language that appears in
section 368(a) (1) (F) save for the omission of the last two words of
(F), "however effected," and suggests that section 368(a) (1) (F)
was in the draftsman's mind. It was the limited Southwest interpeta-
tion of (F) reorganizations that Congress believed it was enacting.1"9
This also has been the interpretation of the Commissioner, and, in the
one ruling on the exemption, it was held that where a corporation
merges with its 95% owned subsidiary and the minority shareholders
of the subsidiary thereby acquire 3% of the stock of the parent, the
transaction does not qualify for the exemption. The exemption was
held to be "not applicable to a change which involves any shift in
ownership, because in any shift in ownership there is involved more than
a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization."'
1 0
Cabot Corp. v. United States,"' the first case involving the
exemption, is indistinguishable on its facts from the revenue ruling.
The court said that the fact that the corporation could have reincor-
porated first and then merged its subsidiary so as to avoid transfer
taxes on the reincorporation was irrelevant and that, citing Southwest,
the shift in ownership resulted in loss of the exemption." 2 The only
other section 4382(b)(1)(D) case, Columbia Gas, Inc. v. United
States,13 arose when the Cumberland and Allegheny Gas Company, a
subsidiary of Columbia Gas System, Inc. and an operator of natural
gas transmission and distribution facilities in West Virginia and in
Maryland, decided to have separate corporate operations in each state.
Therefore, it created a subsidiary, Columbia Gas of Maryland, and
transferred its Maryland assets to the Maryland corporation. Mary-
land issued stock and notes to Columbia and Columbia cancelled stock
and notes of Cumberland which it held. The result was a "split-off"
with Columbia having two subsidiaries instead of one. The Internal
Revenue Service ruled that this was a (D) reorganization." 4 The
court held that no section 4382(b) (1) (D) exemption was available.
109. [A] new exemption in the case of corporate reorganizations where the change
is a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
Such corporate reorganizations . . . presently are free of income tax.
Reorganizations involving a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization, represent merely a formalistic change and do not involve any
shifts in ownership.
S. Rimo. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1958) (emphasis added).
110. Rev. Rul. 63-203, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 580, 581.
111. 220 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 326 F.2d 753 (1st Cir.
1964).
112. Compare Rev. Rul. 66-284, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 115.
113. 366 F.2d 991 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
114. The Service utilized sections 368(a) (1) (D) and 355.
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Although there was 100% continuity of ultimate ownership, the mere
change in the language of the (D) provision was not intended to
include 4ivisive reorganizations. The court believed that section
4382(b) (1) (D) is at least as narrow as section 368(a) (1) (F). How-
ever, in stating that (F) might be broader, it relied on Revenue Ruling
61-15615 and a misinterpretation of San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner."" The dissent expressed the view that since there was
a 100% continuity in ultimate stock ownership, section 4382 (b) ( 1 ) (D)
was actually satisfied.
Although section 4382(b) (1) (D) does not refer to section
3 6 8(a) (1) (F), it probably was meant to cover the same transactions.
Granted that this intention could have been more clearly effectuated by
merely referring to section 368(a) (1) (F), nonetheless, the similar
wording in a part of the Code far removed from corporate reorganiza-
tions cannot be disregarded. The choice of words could hardly have
been fortuitous and it is unreasonable to assume that the same formula
would have different meanings. To have done so would have been less
rational than using a phrase of art without reference to its antecedent.
Sections 381(b)(3), 1244(d)(2), and 4382(b)(1)(D) were
all enacted decades after the original version of (F), and in each
instance the context requires a narrow reading. One must assume
that Congress was cognizant of what it was doing in each of these
three sections, and that it therefore expected a narrow reading. Positing
this reasoned formulation, to assume that Congress intended these sec-
tions to be inconsistent with section 368(a) (1) (F) is dubious. Simi-
larly, to interpret section 368(a) (1) (F) inconsistently with sections
381, 1244, and 4382 is patently inappropriate.
It would seem fair to conclude that any construction of section
368(a) (1) (F) which allows for its application in situations where
there is any change in proprietary interests or any change in the total
assets and operations of a corporation, other than a de minimis change,
can find no support in the language, holdings, or theories underlying
the use of (F) in the other sections of the Code.
C. The Recent Reorganization Cases
In only two recent cases has the Tax Court found an (F) re-
organization. In Pridemark, Inc.," 7 Judge Pierce" 8 found that a
corporation did not completely liquidate, but rather transferred sub-
115. 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62. See pp. 519-20 infra.
116. 77 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 297 U.S. 496 (1936),
modifying 28 B.T.A. 395 (1933). See note 69 supra.
117. 42 T.C. 510 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
118. Judge Pierce wrote the dissent in Gallagher.
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stantially all of its operating assets to a new corporation with sub-
stantially similar shareholders, and that there was a continuity of the
business. Without resorting to either authority or explanations, he
held that the "transactions clearly fall within both the letter and the
intent of section 368(a) (1) (F). . . ." 9 On the basis of the prior
analysis, however, it seems that the holding is incorrect in that it is
inconsistent with the prior case law and revenue rulings. 120  Judge
Pierce found an (F) reorganization, notwithstanding shifts in the
proprietary interests, shifts in the operating assets, and an apparent
lack of continuity of the business activity.
On appeal, the court of appeals did not reverse on the grounds
that (F) was misapplied, but rather it interpreted the facts differently.
The court found no intent -to reincorporate at the time of the liquida-
tion of the old corporation and no continuity in the business activity,
and, therefore, had no occasion to apply the "step-transaction" theory 21
or the reorganization sections. In dictum, however, it was suggested
that an (F) reorganization might include a distribution of some of
the liquid assets.'22 The justification for this observation is not readily
apparent. If a corporation wishes to change its state of incorporation
it can do so by transferring all of its assets to a new corporation for
the shares of the new corporation and then liquidating the old corpo-
ration. If, in the process, the old corporation retains some cash and
119. 42 T.C. at 532 (emphasis added).
120. The corporation had a net book value of $411,328.90 and the shareholders
received about $392,000 in cash and in kind. Both the old and new corporations were
sales agencies for prefabricated homes, but for different manufacturers. Although
the new corporation received from the old corporation the lease for the home office,
the name, and the trade slogan, the old corporation sold to the manufacturer, upon
termination of the dealership contract, for $174,866: customer lists, customers' con-
tracts not yet begun (valued at $134,400), ten sales offices in three states, goodwill,
use of certain trade names, and the right to hire any and all of Pridemark's salesmen.
Pridemark promised not to try to rehire the men for at least one year. Pridemark
lost all of its sales force, and, at the time, intended to liquidate. The principal share-
holder owned 80% of the common, all class B preferred, and none of the class A
preferred of the old corporation, but only 61% of the common of the new corporation.
Nine per cent of the stock in the new corporation was owned by persons who
were not shareholders of the old, one 5% shareholder of the old owned none of the
new, and more than one-half of the old preferred shareholders did not continue in
the new corporation. The new corporation was formed eight months after the sale
of the old's assets, and a few months before signing a new dealership contract,
because the principal shareholder was unsuccessful in other business endeavors.
It is difficult to understand how Judge Pierce ignored the fact that all of the
salesmen of the old corporation had left. One wonders how he held that the new
corporation had substantially all of the operating assets of the old. Judge Pierce's
decision seems totally inconsistent with Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967), aff'g 42 T.C. 558 (1964). With ref-
erence to a corporation of consulting engineers, the court there said that "its most
valuable asset consisted of its reputation and the pool of experienced employees which
passed intact to Engineers. . . .Where a business is largely service oriented, as here,
this item may well be the single most valuable asset." 363 F.2d at 268n.2. This state-
ment appears to be equally applicable to Pridemark, Inc.
121. See pp. 523-25 infra.
122. 345 F.2d at 42. 24
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distributes it to its shareholders, then the transaction will fall within
the framework of (D), thus obviating the need for (F). However,
if the court was referring to a case where a corporation merely changes
its name and, in so doing, causes all of its shareholders to surrender
their old certificates for new ones, then, although there would be an
(F) reorganization, it is hard to see how the distribution of cash could
be held to be part of the "plan of reorganization." It is doubtful
whether a decision to change the name of a corporation would be
contingent on a distribution of cash. As such, the two elements of
the transaction would seem not to be intended by the corporation to
be dependent one upon the other. Under the "mutually interdependent"
theory,123 the two elements would be unrelated and the distribution
could be taxed as a dividend under section 316. This does not make
the distribution a part of the (F) reorganization.
In a recent case, Dunlap & Associates, Inc.,124 the Tax Court
found an (F) reorganization but did so under the more traditional
notions of intent and "mutual interdependence.' i 5 The court refused
to adopt a Davant-Reef approach on the basis that Reef was not con-
trolling since it was factually distinguishable. Subsequently in Asso-
ciated Mach. Shop126 and Estate of Stauffer127 the Tax Court, in
marked contract to the Davant court, held that an (F) reorganization
must take place within a single corporation and can not involve the
combination of two or more separate businesses.
The Commissioner has been even less successful in other recent
cases. In Hyman H. Berghash,12 the sole shareholder of a drugstore
corporation felt compelled to sell a 50% interest to a key employee
in order to retain his services. The employee paid $25,000 for one-
half of the shares of a new corporation, and the old corporation sold
its assets, except cash, to the new corporation for the other one-half
of the shares and a six per cent note with a face value of $96,101.64.
In liquidating, the old corporation distributed the shares, note, and
$49,313.17 in cash. The Tax Court held that this was not an (F)
reorganization because the (F) reorganization "presumes that the
surviving corporation is the same corporation as the predecessor in
every respect, except for minor or technical differences [in other
123. The "mutually interdependent" theory has been stated as: "Were the steps
so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been
fruitless without a completion of the series?" American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397,
405 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950). This theory is discussed in detail at pp. 521-23 infra.
124. 47 T.C. 542 (1967).
125. See pp. 521-23 infra.
126. 48 T.C. 318 (1967).
127. 48 T.C. 277 (1967).
128. 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
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words, the (F) reorganization is] only the simplest and least signifi-
cant of corporate changes."' 29 Since there was a shift in the proprietary
interests, the court held that there was no (F) reorganization.
Either the Commissioner did not argue that the steps could be
segmented or the Tax Court disagreed with the theory without opinion.
In this instance such an argument would be tenuous because the raison
d'itre of the transaction was to bring in a new shareholder who could
not afford a larger investment. Nonetheless, the old corporation could
have created a class of preferred stock and distributed this stock as a
dividend, thereby reducing the value of the common. Gallagher was
used as authority for finding no (F) reorganization, and, as in
Gallagher, -the finding of a (D) reorganization was prevented by the
80% control requirement of section 368(a) (1) (D).
In Book Prod. Indus. Inc., 3' the findings of the Tax Court were
that a new corporation did not acquire substantially all of the operating
assets of the old corporation and the notes of the new corporation that
were held by the shareholder of the old corporation did not represent
a continuing proprietary interest. Therefore, the court concluded that
there was no (F) reorganization.
Finally, in Turner Advertising of Ky., Inc.,"' a case similar to
Gallagher, a new corporation was created where 100% of the share-
holders of the old corporation owned almost 49% of the shares of
the new and the other 51 % of the shares of the new corporation were
in the hands of employees of the principal shareholder of the old
corporation. The new corporation then bought all of the shares of
the old for cash and notes, and, having done so, liquidated the old.
The Government claimed that the sale of 51 % of the shares of the
new corporation should be disregarded as an unrelated transaction.
The Tax Court could not "justify the inclusion of some and the exclu-
sion of other essential steps.""' 2 Rather, the court viewed the trans-
action as a whole, looked to the end result, and found no (D) reorgani-
zation because the control test was not satisfied, and no (F) reorgani-
zation because of the shift in proprietary interests.
D. A Definition for Section 368(a)(1)(F)
At the present time, the regulations contain no definition of the
(F) reorganization. Nevertheless, a definition does emerge from an
analysis of the early use of (F) and its present use in sections 381,
129. Id. at 752.
130. 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 339 (1965).
131. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 532 (1966).
132. Id. at 536.
[VOL. 13 : p. 487
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/2
GALLAGHER REVISITED
1244, and 4382. Such an examination indicates that an (F) reorgani-
zation requires a 100% continuity of shareholders in the same pro-
portions and interests in the new corporation as in the old corporation,
a 100% continuity of corporate assets, and a 100% continuity of
corporate business activities. The only exceptions should be those
adjustments in shareholdings and assets due to matters over which
the corporation has no control, such as an exercise of appraisal rights
by a small dissident minority, and such changes as modifications in
the corporation's charter or certificate of incorporation. This definition
thus describes a relationship between (1) a given group of people,
(2) with a given group of assets, (3) in a given business activity,
and (4) in a corporate entity. The synthesis of this approach is to
suggest that the only meaningful purpose which can be ascribed to
(F) is that if factors (1), (2), and (3) remain constant, then factor
(4) can be changed in name, state of incorporation, or form,' 83 without
any tax consequences.
This definition would exclude Gallagher and Reef on the one
hand, and Davant on the other. In the former cases, there were
changes in proprietary interests, and in the latter case, there was a
change in assets and business activity. Although the definition would
not include a broad variety of cases, there is no evidence to suggest
that it was ever intended to do so. There would not be a complete
overlap with the other reorganization provisions because the definition
includes, as none of the others do, such modifications within one
corporation as a change of name where the old shares are exchanged
for new ones. This definition also has the virtue of not being so
inclusive as to render other parts of section 368(a)(1) meaningless,
of being consistent with the use of (F) in other parts of the Code,
and of being in accord with the interpretation of (F) prior to Revenue
Ruling 61-156.18
IV. SEPARATING THE TRANSACTIONS
In Davant and Reef it was argued that two transactions are
"functionally unrelated," and must be treated separately for tax pur-
133. The meaning of the word "form" is not clear. Perhaps it was intended to
cover a situation where a corporation amends its charter in order to increase the
powers of the corporation. By itself, such an action would hardly appear to be a
reorganization. However, if a corporation does change its charter and name, and
the shareholders trade old shares for new ones, then the word "form" prevents a con-
struction of the section which would exclude any corporation which did more than
merely change its name.
134. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62. See pp. 519-20 infra. For an analysis of (F) that
suggests a similar definition as that proposed see Comment, (F) Reorganizations
and Proposed Alternate Routes for Post Reorganization Net Operating Loss Carry-
backs, 66 MICH. L. Rvv. 498 (1968).
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poses, if one transaction could have been wholly accomplished inde-
pendently of the other. Under this reasoning, it is irrelevant whether
the parties would have done one without the other. The purpose of
segmenting the transaction is to prevent tax avoidance. But, as valid
as such a general purpose may be, it does not provide authority for
a segmentation in all situations.
A. The Commissioner's Weapons
Before Davam, and Reef, the Commissioner had three weapons
he could use to advance the segmentation theory.
1. The Cases - Initially, reliance could be placed on some prior
case law. In Bazley v. Commissioner,"3 5 the taxpayer and his wife
owned all but one of the corporation's one thousand $100 par value
shares. The corporation then exchanged all of these shares for five
thousand $60 stated value, no par, new shares, and $400,000 worth
of debentures. The corporation had an earned surplus of $855,783.82.
The -taxpayer argued that the transaction was a tax-free recapitalization,
but the Commissioner contended that the recapitalization served no
legitimate corporate business purpose and that the securities should
be treated as a dividend. The Supreme Court concluded that the
securities were taxable as a dividend and that the transaction as a
whole was not a tax-free recapitalization.
There is language in the opinion which suggests that there was
a recapitalization. However, since there was no legitimate non-tax
reason for the issuance of the securities and because they could have
been issued independently of a recapitalization, they were treated
separately from any recapitalization. 13 6 On the other hand, there is
language which suggests that in this type of situation there is no
recapitalization at all, and each part of the transaction will be taxed
separately. 117 It is not clear whether Justice Frankfurter viewed the
new stock as having been received as part of a reorganization. In any
event, the Court did reveal a desire to prevent the creation of a loop-
hole which would allow shareholders to receive corporate debt instru-
135. 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
136. What have we here? No doubt, if the Bazley corporation had issued the
debentures . . . without any recapitalization, it would have made a taxable distri-
bution. Instead, those debentures were issued as part of a family arrangement,
the only additional ingredient being an unrelated modification of the capital
account.
Id. at 742.
137. "A 'reorganization' which is merely a vehicle, however elaborate or elegant,
for conveying earnings from accumulations to the stockholders is not a reorganization
under section 112. . . . And even if this transaction were deemed a reorganiza-
tion .. " Id. at 743.
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ments, itaxable as a dividend under section 301, in the form of a tax-
free recapitalization. Perhaps Justice Frankfurter was unclear because
he could have disposed of the case on grounds wholly unrelated to
the question of whether the issuance of the securities was part of a
recapitalization.' Nevertheless, if the case holds anything about
segmenting transactions it is that just as steps cannot be separated
to avoid taxes,139 so they cannot always be combined to avoid taxes.
As questionable as this may be, it is still far removed from recasting
what was done to what could have been done. 140
Another case, Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 141 involved a
dispute over the basis of assets received from a predecessor corporation.
The Tax Court held that the new corporation was created for the
dual purpose of taking over the business of the old corporation and
expanding it by the simultaneous acquisition of certain patents owned
by one of the shareholders of the old corporation. The taxpayer
argued in the court of appeals that the simultaneous transfer to the
new company of both the assets of the old corporation and the patent
rights of the shareholder must be viewed as one transaction and, as
such, the transaction was outside the purview of section 112(b) (4)
of the Revenue Act of 1928.142 In rejecting this argument, the
court said:
There were two separate transfers which did not become trans-
muted into component steps of a single transfer merely because
separate properties were transferred at the same time to one trans-
feree. These two transactions were not . . . mere "procedural"
steps towards the completion of one transaction. Nor were the
two transfers, otherwise distinct, fused into one merely because
138. The bonds involved were 20 year debenture bonds, but were callable at the
option of the corporation (completely controlled by the taxpayer) and were freely
marketable. Bazley v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'g, 4 T.C. 897
(1945). It has been long established that short term notes are to be treated like
cash and not like securities. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
287 U.S. 462 (1933). Bonds which are payable at the option of the bondholders
seem more like cash than even short term notes. Hence, the bonds should not be
considered as within Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.1, § 112(b) (3), but instead, subject
to boot treatment under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.1, § 112(c). The Bazley corpora-
tion had a sufficient earned surplus to cover the distribution and the facts do not
reveal any inability of the corporation to raise the cash should the bonds be called.
Under these circumstances, the so-called doctrine of Commissioner v. Estate of
Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945), would call for dividend treatment for the bonds.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote Bazley only two years after his opinion in Bedford and,
from his language in Bazley, one senses that he was thinking of Bedford and was
determined to tax as a dividend what he believed was essentially a dividend, regardless
of the literal statutory language. Today, Bazley would come under section 356(d).
139. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ; Ahles Realty Corp. v.
Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 611 (1934).
140. This is not to say that courts have never justified results in terms of what
the taxpayer could have done.
141. 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955), aff'g 18 T.C.
1255 (1952).
142. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(b) (4), 45 Stat. 816.
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the interested persons would not have entered into the arrange-
ment unless it involved both transfers contemporaneously.' 43
Judge Frank then went on to say that: "We do not hold that the
dominant aim of the interested persons may never be controlling in
this area. .. ."144 No authority for these propositions is offered by
the court, and the logic of the opinion is difficult to follow. It is not
at all self-apparent that the two transfers were separate and unrelated.
2. Legislative History. - The Commissioner's second weapon
in support of his "functionally unrelated" theory comes from the legis-
lative history. The House version of the 1954 Code included a sec-
tion'45 which would have covered the Gallagher situation. The Senate
deleted this section without explanation, but in the conference report,
the Managers of the House explained:
The House bill in section 357 contained a provision dealing with
a device whereby it has been attempted to withdraw corporate
earnings at capital gains rates by distributing all the assets of
a corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporating
the business assets. This provision gave rise to certain technical
problems and it has not been retained in the bill as recommended
by the accompanying conference report. It is the belief of the
managers on the part of the House that, at the present time, the
possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious
143. 218 F.2d at 57-58.
144. Id. at 58.
145. (a) GENERAL RULE. - In any case in which one or more individuals
receives assets in a complete or partial liquidation as defined in section 336 from
a corporation controlled by such individual or individuals and within 5 years
from the date of the final distribution in such liquidation transfer more than 50 per
cent of such assets (other than money and stock or securities (other than stock
or securities representing an interest in the distributing corporation)) to one or
more corporations controlled by one or more of such individuals in a transaction
to which section 351 is applicable-
(1) the corporation to which any of such assets have been transferred
shall be deemed to have received such assets from the liquidating corporation
pursuant to a corporate acquisition of property within the meaning of section
359(c) ; and
(2) an amount equal to the fair market value of the assets received in
liquidation not so transferred shall be deemed to have been received by the indi-
viduals in control of such other corporation or corporations as a distribution under
section 352 pursuant to such corporate acquisition of property and such distribution
shall be deemed to have occurred on the date the assets were transferred to such
other corporation or corporations. For the purpose of this subsection one or more
individuals shall be considered to be in control of a corporation if such individuals
own directly or indirectly stock which represents at least 50 per cent of the total
combined voting power of the outstanding stock of such corporation or at least
50 per cent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation.
(b) TRANSFERS NOT IN AVOIDANCE OF TAX. - Subsection
(a) shall not be applicable in any case in which it is established by the taxpayer
that such transactions did not have as one of their principal purposes the
avoidance of tax on corporate distributions of property under section 301.
(c) ATTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP. - For the purpose of this section
in determining the ownership of stock and the receipt of assets, section 311 shall be
applicable.
H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 357 (1954).
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to require a special statutory provision. It is believed that this
possibility can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision
or by regulation within the framework of the other provisions
of the bill.146
This statement suggests that the Commissioner now has authority
to end all evils in this area in any way. However, the deletion of
section 357 suggests that Congress did not intend to produce a result
different from Gallagher. Seemingly, the most sensible interpretation
of the two events would be to ignore them both, entirely. Omissions
and general expectations are of little value in interpreting statutory
language.
3. Regulations and Rulings. - The third weapon of the Com-
missioner has developed through self-serving regulations and rulings.
There are but two regulations which give any support to the Com-
missioner's approach. The first is pursuant to section 331, and
provides:
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another
corporation of all or part of the assets of the liquidating corpora-
tion or which is preceded by such a transfer may . . . have the
effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a transaction in which
no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the extent of
"other property." See sections 301 and 356.'
This regulation has no apparent support in the cases or statutes,
and it had no precedent in the regulations. If it refers to the reincor-
poration cases, 14 it fails to mention them, save the reference to section
356. Even if reliance is placed on cases outside the reorganization
area, it constitutes a questionable interpretation of the word "complete"
in the "complete liquidation" provision of section 33 1.149 Section
331 (a) (1) speaks of "complete liquidation of a corporation" and this
is to be contrasted with "partial liquidation" in section 331(a)(2).
The word "complete" connotes dissolution of the corporate shell, and
has no obvious reference to the continuity of a business enterprise by
a group of shareholders. Furthermore, it has been held that where a
corporate entity is actually liquidated but the transaction is not a
146. H.R. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
148. Cases cited notes 26, 27 & 28 supra.
149. But see Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorpora-
tion-Liquidation, 28 U. CIN. L. REv. 304 (1959) ; Rice, When Is a Liquidation Not a
Liquidation for Federal Tax Purposes?, 8 STAN. L. Riv. 208 (1956). "It may
reasonably be argued as a matter of proper tax administration that where the partici-
pants in the enterprise continue to carry it on after a formal liquidation, the tax
advantages arising from the liquidation should be denied them." Id. at 208.
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complete liquidation, it must, then, be a reorganization.'" This is
the sensible statutory interpretation. The reorganization sections are
designed to deal with situations where there is a continuity of share-
holder interests in business enterprises and have been used where, as
a step in the reorganization, a corporation is liquidated.' 5 ' Dividend
treatment is defined in section 316 and results solely from a corporation-
shareholder relationship. Where there is a liquidation, there can be
a dividend only if there is some corporation to provide the relationship.
To ignore the reorganization sections and find a dividend in a liquida-
tion-reorganization situation would render sections 368, 354, and 356
nugatory in this area because all of the statutory requirements for a
reorganization could be ignored. Although it may be desirable to
impose dividend treatment where there is less than 80% control in
a new corporation, the problem would seem to lie in the statutory
definitions of reorganization, not in the concepts. The appropriate
cure, if there is an ill, is to change the requirements for a reorganization.
The vague phrase, "may have the effect," renders the entire
regulation meaningless and totally hides the thoughts of the draftsman.
The reference to section 301 is equally perplexing because section
331 (b) explicitly states that section 301 shall not apply to distributions
in partial or complete liquidation.
The second regulation is almost as lacking in foundation as the
first. It was issued under section 301, and provides:
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is within
the terms of section 301 although it takes place at the same time
as another transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate
transaction whether or not connected in a formal sense. This is
most likely to occur in the case of a recapitalization, a reincorpora-
tion, or a merger of a corporation with a newly organized corpora-
tion having substantially no property." 2
This regulation appears to be inspired by the Bazley case.' How-
ever, Congress resolved the Bazley situation by section 356(d), and in
150. Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Joseph C. Gallagher,
39 T.C. 144 (1962), appeals dismissed, Nos. 18844, 18845 (9th Cir., Sept. 23, 1963) ;
accord, Pridemark, Inc., 42 T.C. 510 (1964), rev'd in part on other grounds, 345 F.2d
35 (4th Cir. 1965). But see Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967) (where the court first concluded that there was no
liquidation and then, as an independent matter, found that there was a reorganization) ;
Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) (In dictum, the
court said that if a corporation liquidates but the shareholders do not sever them-
selves from the business enterprise, there will be no complete liquidation. However,
the court did not say whether this would necessitate finding a reorganization).
151. See cases cited notes 26, 27 & 28 supra.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(1)(1955).
153. The only example given in the regulations is indistinguishable from Bazley.
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so doing obviated the necessity for any regulation based upon Bazley.
Moreover, the theory underlying the regulation is totally inconsistent
with section 356(d). The statute considers the distribution to be part
of the reorganization and then taxes it as a dividend. However, the
regulation attempts to treat the distribution as separate from the
reorganization. Finally, not only is the foundation of the regulation
shaky, but, in addition some of its language is ambiguous. The phrase
"in substance a separate transaction whether or not connected in a
formal sense" is unexplained and the reference to "reincorporation"
and "mergers" with new corporations is text without context.
Revenue Ruling 61-156,' in revoking Revenue Ruling 56-541,"'5
represents a synthesis of all of the abovementioned weapons. The
ruling has been severely criticized. 50 In the ruling, a corporation in
liquidation sold all of its assets to a new corporation formed by the
management of the old corporation for 45% of the stock, cash, and
notes of the new corporation. Immediately thereafter, the new corpora-
tion sold 55% of its stock to the public and the old corporation liqui-
dated. The ruling holds this to be a recapitalization ((E) reorganiza-
tion) followed by a change in identity ((F) reorganization). The sale
of stock to the public was:
disregarded as being a separate transaction, since even without it
the dominant purpose - to withdraw corporate earnings while
continuing the equity interest in substantial part in a business enter-
prise conducted in corporate form - was fully achieved. The
issuance of stock to new investors was not needed to implement the
dominant purpose and, therefore, the rest of the transaction was
not fruitless without it and so dependent on it.
157
The primary authorities relied on in the ruling were sections 1.331-
1 (c) and 1.30 1-1 (1) of the regulations, the legislative history referred
to above, and Bazley. The retention of 45% of the stock was ex-
plained as a sufficient continuity of interest,1 8 and neither section
368(a) (1) (D) nor Southwest was mentioned. The ruling is most
154. 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62; See p. 507 supra. See generally Goldman, Revised
"Reincorporation Doctrine" Upsets Planners; Rev. Rul. 61-156 Analyzed, 17 J.
TAXATION 148 (1962).
155. 1956-2 CUm BULL. 189 (holding that when owners of 80% of the stock
of the old corporation owned 45% of the stock of the new corporation, there was
no reorganization and the distribution in liquidation was not subject to dividend
treatment).
156. See Morrison, The Line Between Liquidations and Reorganizations, 41
TAxts 785, 792-99 (1963) ; Nicholson, Recent Developments in the Reincorporation
Area, 19 TAX L. Rev. 123, 133-39 (1964) ; Whitaker, Liquidation and Reincorporation,
U. So. CAL. 1966 TAX INST. 191, 206.
157. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62, 63.
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notable for its lack of authority. As such, it is, at best, a mere bootstrap
ruling for a Gallagher type of situation.
Furthermore, Revenue Ruling 61-156 apparently ignores the fact
that the sale of stock to the public did cause a substantial change in the
economic position of the parties. By disregarding this step the ruling
disregards the net effect of the entire transaction.159 The transaction
was not a sham, nor did it lack economic substance, and therefore, it
should be taken into account notwithstanding the fact that it was moti-
vated by the desire to minimize taxes. 6 ° Pursuant to the ruling there
would be a tax on the boot under section 301. This would result in
harsher tax treatment than if the old shareholders had held 80% of
the stock of the new corporation so as to qualify the transaction as a
(D) reorganization. Under section 301, the boot is taxed as a divi-
dend in full, while under section 356, the boot from a (D) reorganiza-
tion is taxed as a dividend only to the extent of the gain in the transac-
tion. The ruling neither justifies nor recognizes this harsher result.
These criticisms of the ruling are equally applicable to the result
that the "functionally unrelated" theory would produce in Gallagher.
There seems to be little difference between segmenting a transaction by
a "dominant purpose" or by a "functionally unrelated" theory.
B. The Judicial Technique
The problem of discerning what events are part of the reorganiza-
tion is caused by three sections. Section 35 4 (a) (1) provides that: "No
gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities . . . are, in pur-
suance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or
securities . ,"101 Section 356 provides that if section 354 would
apply but for the fact that there is also received other property, then
gain will be recognized but only to the extent of the value of the other
property. Although section 368 defines "reorganization," it does not
define "in pursuance of the plan of reorganization." Just as the statute
is unclear, so the courts have never clarified the constituent elements of
"the reorganization." '162 Three types of theories have developed,
however.
159. See Nicholson, .supra note 156, at 134-36.
160, United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); Granite
Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Day &
Zimmerman, Inc., 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945). But see Woodworth v. Commissioner,
218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955) (court recognized validity of desire to minimize taxes
but still held against taxpayer).
161. Emphasis added.
162. See generally Manning, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization": The
Scope of the Reorganization Provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARV, L. Rev.
881 (1959).
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1. Mutual Interdependence. - The first is generally called the
"mutual interdependence" test. The theory had its origin in an article
by Randolph Paul,'63 but it is generally associated with the American
Bantam Car Co.' case. This case involved a bankrupt corporation,
American Austin Car Company, which was liquidated under the di-
rection of the bankruptcy court in 1935. The assets were sold to three
associates for $5000 in cash and the assumption of liabilities of $219,
099.83. The associates then transferred the property to the newly formed
American Bantam Car Company for stock. Because the corporation
needed cash to commence operations, a contract was simultaneously
entered into with underwriters who agreed to sell preferred stock and
to be paid in common stock in addition to their underwriting discounts
and commissions. Payments to the underwriters were contingent upon
the sale of the preferred stock.
The litigation centered on a determination of the basis of the
assets for purposes of depreciation. This determination turned on
whether the incorporation was tax-free under section 112 (b) (5) of the
Revenue Act of 1936, which in turn depended on control as defined in
section 112(h) of the same Act (which section is comparable to the
current section 368(c)). By October of 1937, the associates no longer
held 80% of the stock and the question was whether they had control
"immediately after the exchange." The taxpayer argued that all of the
steps were part of one transaction, the end result of which was that the
associates had no control. The court held that the transaction was
complete upon transfer of the assets to the petitioner. The test was stated
as: "Were the steps so interdependent that the legal relations created
by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of
the series?"' 6' What does "fruitless" mean? The court answered the
question by saying:
The understanding with the underwriters for disposing of the
preferred stock, however important, was not a sine qua non in the
general plan, without which no other step would have been taken.
While the incorporation and exchange of assets would have been
purposeless one without the other, yet both would have been
carried out even though the contemplated method of marketing
the preferred stock might fail.' 6
The factors which motivated the court were that, before their
transfer to the corporation, the associates were not contractually bound
163. R. PAUL, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIVS IN FEDERAL TAXATION
200 (2d Series 1938).
164. 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
165. Id. at 405.
166. Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added).
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to'transfer stock to the underwriters, and that the underwriters had, at
best, only contingent rights of,, ownership., The court was. convinced
that the associates Would have treated the -new 'corporation regardless
of the contract with the underwriters and that the associates intended
to be in control of the corporation until the underwriters sold stock
to the public. The test of the court was not "could" one step have been
taken without the other, but,.rather, "would" one step;be so taken. As
such, the test is no more than a formula for seeking the subjective intent
of the parties, 67 and. the holding is ,a finding .that the parties would
have taken one step, regardless of the other.
Subsequent cases support this analysis. 6 " Where the parties had
no intention of retaining 80% control and at the date of transfer had
already executed a "firm, commitment" underwriting contract, the
transfer and sale of stock were held to be mutually interdependent.' 69
The manifest intent of the parties, controls whether or not this theory
will, 7 ' or will, not,'7 ' .be invoked. But when the courts believe that
the parties would take the. first -step regardless of the success of the
second and when they were not bound to take the second when they
took the first the steps will not be combined.,
72 ,
It has, been suggested that since most of the "mutual interde-
pendence" cases involve questions of "control immediately after" the
transfer, the doctrine should be restricted to this issue. 173 This would
give too great an emphasis .to the doctrine. While it .has been used
loosely,'74, it, is an aspect ofthe broader test of "intent." It is to be
noted that ithe cases under the test have considered the intent of the
parties not fotdetermining .whether 'they intended to, dosomething to
save taxes,, but- for determining the narrow issue of -intent, to coptrol.
Rather, than, being an 'independent .test -justifying the segmenting of
167. See.Mintz & Plum, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U.
'124h I4S.'6N Ff6: TAk. 247, 285,(1954) ' . .
(,:fi168. ",Compare 'South, Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, .345 F.2d 698 I (2d Cir. 1964);
Henning ,Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 461 (1960); Southwell Combing Co., 30 T.C.
487' (1958)" and, First' Seaft'Dexter' Hortbn Nat'l Bank, 27 B.T.A. '1242 '(1933),
affd, 77' F.2d.45' (9th 'Cir. 1935),:z ith Commissioner v. National Bellas Hess, Inc.,
220.F.2d,415 (8th.Cir. 1955), aff g 20 T.C. 636 (1953).and Scientific Instrument Co.,
17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F2d 155 (6th Cir 1953).' ' 1
- 169.''Overland Corp.,i'42 T.'C't 26; (1964)'-;!'accord, e~g., Hizeltine COrp. V. Com-
missioner, 89 F.2d 513, 518 (3d Cir. 1937) 'i7Bassick 'v. Commissioner ,85, F.2d 8, 10
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1936).
1 170., See Commissioner v. National Bellas -Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir.
1955) ;,Avco Mfg. Corp., 25 T.C. 975 (1956)'; Scientific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253,,4257-58 (1952)-.-" J .. . . . . . .. '. . : . . ' " ' . .: : ' : " .
171. See South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1965);
cf.. Maine Steel, Inc. v. United States, 174 F Supp.. 702, (D. Me. 1959).
172. See,' e.g., Coimiissionei 'v.'National Bellas Hess,' Inc.; ;2A2.- -F;,d 415 (th
Cir. 1955) ; Scientific Instrument-Co., 17. T.C. 1253. (1952).!
173" Mintz'& Plumb, supr a- not'e167,at 252-53, 285. '., '
174. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62 (refersto "fruitless"as
if the word were an independent statutory test),. S~e,.pp.;.519-20 supra.
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a transaction, the "mutually interdependent" test is merely another
judicial phrase of art which is, or should be, used to describe, in short-
hand, one method for determining what was actually intended by the
parties to be included within the entire transaction. No case has been
found in which the doctrine was invoked to justify segmenting the
transaction'7 5 where: there was a contract to do a number of things,
the parties intended to do all of them, the parties had no way of avoid-
ing any steps after the first was taken, the parties would not have done
one without the other, and the parties did all of the things.
2. Step-Transactions. - Cases professing to adopt the "step-
transaction" approach do not afford any stronger authority for the
Commissioner's theory of segmentation. 7 6 Unfortunately, the cases
do not fall into distinguishable categories. Meaningless generalizations
such as "form over substance," ".tax effects depend on economic reali-
ties," and "mere shams will be disregarded" do not go far in embody-
ing the Code with substantive meaning.
Nonetheless, certain patterns have been established. In Liddon
v. Commissioner,1 7 a husband and wife owned 80% of the stock of
a Pontiac dealership. Davis, the general manager, owned the remain-
ing 20%. In 1948, Davis wished to retire and on April 26, 1948, the
shareholders voted to liquidate the corporation. On May 1, 1948, the
new Liddon Pontiac Corporation was created and owned entirely by
the Liddons. The old corporation sold its assets at book value to the
new corporation. The new corporation also entered into a new franchise
agreement with Pontiac, the old agreement having been previously
cancelled. The Liddons received over $150,000 from the old corpora-
tion and invested $25,000 in the new corporation. Both the Tax
175. But see Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62, discussed at pp. 519-20 supra.
In American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d
513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950), there was a contract, but the
rights under the contract were contingent. The court believed that the case differed
from one where a contract establishes rights which are not dependent upon subsequent
acts of the parties. Compare Overland Corp., 42 T.C. 26 (1964). Regardless of the
validity of the distinction, the inquiry for the court was whether the parties intended
one element of the transaction to be absolutely linked to the accomplishment of the
other.
176. Although Mintz & Plumb, supra note 167, at 285, agrees with the text,
Manning, supra note 162, does not. According to Manning, "the fact that a reorgani-
zation is planned should not necessarily bring the entire transaction under the
reorganization provisions. There is a difference between a plan which involves a
reorganization and a plan of reorganization." Id. at 897. Manning suggests that an
element must be "directly germane to the readjustment of a corporate business in
modified forms." Id. at 910. "[T]he question is whether it furthers the readjust-
ment.... " Id. at 898. Theoretically, the solution is appealing. Nonetheless, it is as
meaningful to apply Manning's test in cases such as Gallagher as it is to use a
"functionally unrelated" test. The suspicion remains that, at least for the Gallagher
type of situation, the solution lies in a change in the Code.
177. 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956).
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Court and the Sixth Circuit rejected the Liddons' argument that
because this was a liquidation, it could not be a reorganization. Rather
they held that this was a reorganization and that the boot was taxable
as a dividend. The Sixth Circuit found that the parties intended from
the beginning to take each step and that all the steps were part of the
"plan of reorganization." The flavor of the judicial attitude is apparent
in the following passage:
Moreover, we are of the opinion that the Tax Court was
correct in analyzing what was done in this case from the point
of view of its overall net effect, rather than to permit one isolated
transaction in a series to determine the tax consequences. The
tax law, as has been often said, seeks generally to deal with sub-
stance rather than form, and particularly is this so in reorganiza-
tion cases. "Transitory phases of an arrangement frequently are
disregarded under these sections of the revenue acts where they
add nothing of substance to the completed affair. . . .Here they
were no more than intermediate procedural devices utilized to
enable the new corporation to acquire all the assets of the old
one pursuant to a single reorganization plan." Helvering v. Ala-
bama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 1942, 315 U.S. 179, 184-185.
178
Steps are combined, or not combined, most frequently on the
basis of what the parties intended to be in the "plan of reorganiza-
tion. ' 17 9  Quite often the court will say that combining the steps in
such a situation is the approach most consistent with congressional
intent. 180 Again, as in Liddon, courts will often then claim to base
the tax results on the "net effect" of the transactions.18'
178. Id. at 309.
179. Compare Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967) ; South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d
Cir. 1965) ; Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956), affg 23 T.C. 196 (1954) ; May Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223
(9th Cir. 1952) ; Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) ; Heller v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945); Love v.
Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 611 (1934) ; Estate of James F. Suter, 29 T.C. 244 (1957) and
First Seattle Dexter Horton Nat'l Bank, 27 B.T.A. 1242 (1933), aff'd, 77 F.2d 45
(9th Cir. 1935), with United States v. Arcade Co. 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953) ; Benricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Helvering, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 625 (1941), aftg 40 B.T.A. 1100 (1939) ; Sharp v. United States, 263 F. Supp.
884 (S.D. Tex. 1966) ; Charles R. Mathis, Jr., 19 T.C. 1123 (1953), and Robert Camp-
bell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950).
180. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) ; George Whittel
& Co., 34 B.T.A. 1070 (1936).
181. See, e.g., Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967) ; James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964) ; David
T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
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In all of these cases, the question involved a determination of
which steps were in the "plan of reorganization." This, in turn, de-
pended on a judicial interpretation of the subjective intent of the
parties. The reason given for combining the steps was to prevent
avoidance of tax by an artificial separation of those steps which the
parties intended to be part of the entire plan. Granted, one can
generalize and say that the courts held that the tax results were a
function of the "net effect" intended by the parties. But this simplifica-
tion ignores the fact that the "net effect" was nonetheless a "reorganiza-
tion" within the statutory definitions and that no steps which the
parties intended to be necessary parts of the transaction were separated
from the plan of reorganization.8 2
3. The "Functionally Unrelated" Test. - By way of contrast,
the Davant-Reef approach ignores both the steps intended and the
steps actually taken by the parties. It seeks to tax the motive of the
parties, not their actions. The contrast between the approaches can
be easily seen: the "mutually interdependent" and "step-transaction"
theories combine or separate steps on the basis of what was done and
then apply the Code to the final result actually achieved, while the
"functionally unrelated" test segments a whole transaction and then
recasts the form in order to tax a hypothetical step where the end
form intended and achieved could not be so taxed under the present
Code. In Reef, if the court merely looked at the position of the parties
before and after the series of transactions, and if it held that the tax
consequences would depend on this end result, regardless of the means
used to reach it,'88 the court would probably not have held that there
was an (F) reorganization due to the drastic shift in the proprietary
interests. It was only by recasting the transaction into a redemption,
an unrelated change of corporate shells, and a dividend, and then
imposing tax consequences not on the basis of the end result but on
the basis of what the tax consequences would be if these recast steps
were the form that the parties chose, that the court was able to find an
(F) reorganization. If a taxpayer cannot create forms in order to
escape taxes,8 4 there appears to be no reason why the Commissioner
182. But cf. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U S 737 741-42 (1947); Bard-Parker
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906
(1955); Bedford v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 341, 343, (2d Cir. 1945) (where, how-
ever, the segmentation was based upon the intent of the parties).
183. "A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result
because reached by following a devious path." Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302
U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
184. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Liddon v. Commis-
sioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Survaunt v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947).
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can create forms in order to impose taxes. It is one thing to ignore
a "meaningless" step, but it is quite another to tax a form that the
Commissioner has substit' :ted for what was actually done.
The other major fault in the "functionally unrelated" test is that
it is inherently self-contradictory. In Reef, as in Revenue Ruling
61-156,18 the Commissioner, in effect, argues that the steps must
be combined and the transaction viewed as a whole in order to deter-
mine the net effect. Once this is done, the steps are then separated
in order -to find, or create, a step to which, in isolation, the Code can
be applied. In Gallagher and in Revenue Ruling 61-156, the Commis-
sioner articulated this as taxing the "dominant motive." This formula
is no different, in substance, from the "functionally unrelated" formula.
Similarly, section 1.331-1 (c) 186 of the Regulations seeks to combine
transactions in order to ignore a liquidation, while section 1.301-
1(1)... seeks to segment. Revenue Ruling 61-156 invokes both. It
is difficult to understand how a single step can be both part of a
transaction and not part of it.188
Thus, the "functionally unrelated" test not only lacks authority, but
also lacks logic. To apply it to Gallagher, and to impose a (D) or (F)
reorganization, requires one to view the transaction as a redemption
of some shareholders, an independent transfer of the assets to a new
corporation with a concomitant distribution of boot to the continuing
shareholders, and an isolated sale of stock to new persons. Thus the
end result is neither aI (D) reorganization, because the 80% control
requirement is not met, nor an (F), since there is a shift in proprietary
interests. But, in order to tax the "dominant motive" of withdrawing
earnings, the "functionally unrelated" step is created and taxed. The
taxation of motives is not yet part of the Code. Moreover, given the
length and complexity of the Internal Revenue Code, one would expect
that if an end result were to have a certain tax effect, there would
be authority in the Code for it. The use of the "functionally unrelated"
concept is not a case of interpreting the statute to define what is part
of a "plan," but is instead an attempt to change the statute so as to
avoid the control requirements of section 368(a) (1) (D).
The thrust of the foregoing analysis suggests that the "function-
ally unrelated" concept has virtually no authority to support it and is
inconsistent with the concepts heretofore used to determine which
parts of a series of transactions are to be grouped together for tax
185. 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62. See pp. 519-20 supra.
186. See p. 517 supra.
187. See p. 518 supra.
188. Whitaker, Liquidation and Reincorporation, U. So. CAL. 1966 TAX INST.
191, 210.
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purposes. The action of the Commissioner in this area is very different
from his action in other situations where the literal language of the
Code is not met." 9 The analysis of the Commissioner does not ignore
a requirement where, in the final form, its effect has been realized;
instead, it ignores a requirement where, in the end, the 80% control
requirement of (D) has not been fulfilled. If a provision of section
368(a) ( 1 ) (D) is to be repealed, then Congress should do the repealing.
V. CONCLUSION
It is probably safe to assume that the taxpayers in Gallagher
proceeded as they did in order to remove cash from the corporation
at capital gains rates. If so, and if the 80% control test of (D) is a
simple way to avoid dividend treatment, the solution would appear
to lie in reducing the per cent of control needed under section 368
(a) (1) (D), and not in either artificially segmenting transactions or
in misusing section 368(a) (1) (F). The various legislative proposals
directed at solving this problem have all adopted the former approach.'9
This tack would appear to be more sensible than the approach of the
Commissioner because if Davant-Reef and Revenue Ruling 61-15601
are applied to Gallagher to tax the boot as a dividend, then section
368(a) (1) (D) will have been completely submerged in an unfounded
concept of an (F) reorganization.
Both Davant and Reef held that there was a (D) reorganization.
Therefore, the rejection of the "functionally unrelated" concept does
not prevent the imposition of dividend treatment on the boot in those
cases; rather, the rejection only precludes results for which the Code
does not, at present, provide.
189. See p. 495 supra.
190. See, e.g., H.R. 4459, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. '§ 26 (1959); H.R. 8300, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 357 (1954). See also MacLean, Probleins of Reincorporation and
Related Proposals of the Subchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAx L. Rlv. 407 (1958).
191. 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 62.
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